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COPYRIGHT FIRST SALE AND THE OVER-
RIDING ROLE OF CONTRACT
Raymond T. Nimmer*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the relationship between the
copyright law doctrine of "first sale," and the general law and
practice of contracts. In a fundamental sense, this is a very
simple topic, although some commentators muddy the topic
by arguing for policy positions that have not been and should
not be enacted.
Under U.S. law, the relationship between contract and
copyright law doctrine can be summarized in a few sentences.
Contract law sets out doctrines that enable and enforce terms
created by voluntary actions or agreements. Copyright law is
a property rights system, the rules of which attach to
particular subject matter ("works of authorship") regardless
of any voluntary act or agreement. In this sense, the two
bodies of law are independent, and create parallel remedial
or rights-creating systems.' Contractual terms can be
established and enforced even though they differ from
copyright terms simply because enforcement of those terms is
grounded in the enforcement of contractual promises, and not
in direct enforcement of property rights.
But contractual terms have a second relationship to
copyright that emerges with the first sale doctrine. As with
any property rights system, conveyance in whole or in part of
interests in the copyrighted property hinges on the contract
* Dean and Leonard Childs Professor of Law, University of Houston Law
Center.
1. Indeed, as discussed later in this article, this separate character is also
recognized in the cases that address whether copyright law preempts contract.
See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996);
Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(copyright did not preempt contract claim). See also DaimlerChrysler Servs. N.
Am., L.L.C. v. Summit Nat'l, Inc., 144 F. App'x 542 (6th Cir. 2005).
1311
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
and the terms of the contractual transaction. In particular,
under the so-called "first sale" doctrine, statutory law
provides an exemption from certain aspects of the copyright
property right, but only to persons who become "owners" of a
copy. But it is the terms of the contract transferring the copy
that determine whether ownership has been transferred.'
Thus, contract terms dominate both as to contract
remedies and as to the existence of the property rights
exemption. The question is not whether contract terms can
control application of first sale rules, but how they can
exercise that control. As we shall see, appellate courts hold
that copy ownership has not been conveyed if the terms of the
contract (license) limit the transferee's right to use or transfer
the work that forms the most valuable part of the copy in
ways that are inconsistent with ownership.' The
determinative issue of whether there has been a first sale is
whether there was an enforceable contract restricting use of
the work in ways inconsistent with the rights of a first sale
owner.
First sale rules are best understood as defining the
property rights consequences of a marketing decision made by
the person that controls the copyright; that marketing
decision is then incorporated in contract terms. If a rights
owner elects to simply sell or give away copies, then first sale
rules give the buyer certain limited rights, such as the right
to resell the copy, under property law. But if the copyright
owner (or its agent) elects not to sell copies, first sale rules do
not apply. The first sale doctrine is simply a default rule
applicable to property rights in reference to one type of
market transaction. The doctrine does not require that works
be transferred via sales of copies, but merely specifies the
property rights consequences if a sale or gift occurs.
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117 (2006).
3. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010) (no
first sale); Wall Data Inc. v. L. A. Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 785 (9th
Cir. 2006) (licensee not an owner); DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns,
Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (no first sale); Stenograph L.L.C. v.
Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
4. See Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1109.
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II. THE CONTEXT
To understand the relationship between contract terms
and first sale it is useful to understand the context in which
the issue is debated. There are many aspects to this, but this
paper focuses on only three themes relevant in our current
context. Each revolves around a fundamental dispute about
the proper role and the proper strength of intellectual
property rights as a means to support and encourage creative
works.
A. Information Wars
The first, and broadest, contextual theme concerns what I
have elsewhere described as the "information wars."' Stated
simply, generated in part by the explosion in the value of
information assets in the digital era, there exist two
diametric and sharply opposed views about the appropriate
present and future role of intellectual property in reference to
the creative or inventive enterprise. The political and policy
debate between the two viewpoints is not limited to the
United States, but crosses borders globally. Both sides are
well-funded, and neither is often willing to compromise with
the other's view.
The one side, which I describe as the "rights restrictors"
viewpoint, believes that strong intellectual property rights
can often stifle creative work and disrupt or preclude the
creation of efficient, relatively low-cost markets for
information.' Strong rights, according to this view, diminish
the ability of subsequent parties to use part or all of the
original work in their own subsequent works, or to use (e.g.,
copy or distribute) the entire work for purposes different than
those intended for the original work.' As a result of their
belief in this premise, this group pushes to truncate or
eliminate rights, and to expand exemptions or defenses. This
they argue enables subsequent parties to use portions of an
original work, or to use the entire work itself, to open
secondary markets from which the copyright owner will
5. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1:2
(West 1997, 2010 Supp.). See generally ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES (2010).
6. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1:2.
7. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79
(1994) (establishing the concept of transformative use as fair use).
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derive no income. The argument is not that no intellectual
property rights should exist, but that the rights should be
tailored to provide only the minimum necessary support for
original work. This group argues that, when in doubt, courts
and legislators should err on the side of reducing rights,
rather than expanding or preserving them. One author,
describing a main theme followed by this group, commented
that the belief is that, when copyright law is in actual or
perceived conflict with any other social interest, the other
interest should prevail.'
It is under this general banner that we see decisions such
as the Ninth Circuit ruling in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com.' In
that case, an online search engine copied images from other
websites and reduced them to thumbnail images that were
then used commercially on a visual search engine.o All of
this occurred without the permission of the copyright owner."
Although the court acknowledged that these facts presented a
prima facie case of direct infringement, it held that this
verbatim copying was a protected fair use, commenting:
Just as a "parody has an obvious claim to transformative
value" because "it can provide social benefit, by shedding
light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a
new one," a search engine provides social benefit by
incorporating an original work into a new work, namely,
an electronic reference tool. Indeed, a search engine may
be more transformative than a parody because a search
engine provides an entirely new use for the original
work ... .12
But the court's reference to "transformative use" perverts the
concept set out by the Supreme Court when it used this
language in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music." The Court there
8. See James V. DeLong, Defending Intellectual Property, in COPY FIGHTS
17, 19 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews eds., 2002).
9. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir.
2007).
10. Id. at 1155-57.
11. Id. at 1157.
12. Id. at 1165 (citations omitted).
13. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's
words, whether the new work merely "supersedels] the objects" of the
original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
* meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
1314 [Vol:51
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dealt with the use of only part of a work to create an entirely
different work-a parody.14 In Perfect 10, by contrast, the
defendant used a complete copy of the work, but for a purpose
different from that intended by the copyright owner. 1 The
different purpose, however, did not transform the work but
potentially preempted a market for the work that the rights
owner might very well have decided to enter by direct
participation or through licensing. 16
More generally, the issue was not whether search
engines provide a social benefit." The issue was whether
copyright owners should be forced to contribute their works in
full to the search engine for free in order to support this
alleged social benefit. This issue was one of allocating
potentially significant value between the copyright owner and
the search engine aggregator. The Ninth Circuit shifted
value away from content providers and to aggregators (search
engine). 18
The competing viewpoint to the rights restrictors, which I
describe as "rights enhancers" viewpoint, believes that strong
intellectual property rights are essential to preserving the
innovation that has led to the modern explosion in
information asset innovation, and its widespread
distribution.1 The perspective is that strong protection of
intellectual property is critical, especially with respect to the
many contexts in which substantial time, cost and effort are
involved in making the creative work and disseminating it.2 0
This core premise leads to the observation that modern
technology, while offering many new opportunities for
creating and distributing information, also threatens the
practical ability to enforce rights, thus weakening long-
standing incentives established under copyright law.2 ' The
extent the new work is "transformative."
Id. at 579.
14. See id. at 572.
15. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir.
2007).
16. Id. at 1168.
17. See id. at 1165. This same concept was recognized, but not resolved, in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929-30
(2005).
18. See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165.
19. See NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1:2.
20. See id.
21. Id.
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argument is that this effect should be offset by enhanced,
tailored rights.22 It is not that there should be no exemptions
or defenses, but that the balance to be established should be
drawn in a manner favorable to creating or maintaining
robust incentives for creative work.
In addition, the rights enhancer position objects to an
increasing tendency in modern law to shift the value obtained
from commercial use of creative works away from the creative
author and towards aggregators, new technology companies,
and individuals who "borrow" (copy) extensively from the
work of others or simply make it broadly and freely available.
The Perfect 10 case discussed above is one such case.2 3 But
there are other illustrations. For example, in Scranton Times
L.P. v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co.,24 a case dealing with
alleged misappropriation of online obituaries from a
newspaper's website, the court held that no state law
misappropriation claim existed even though the defendant
routinely copied the obituaries into its own website. 25  The
court approached the issue from a perspective of whether the
misappropriation claim survived copyright preemption. It
concluded that no claim for this type of cause of action could
survive unless it was proven that allowing the appropriation
to continue would result in the content creator stopping the
production of the content.26 In this case, the court felt that
publication of obituaries would continue as part of the
ordinary business of a local newspaper. 27 But, of course, this
holding, coupled with the belief that the obituaries were not
copyrighted material, shifted value from the content
publisher to third parties, such as aggregators and search
engines.28
22. Id.
23. See generally Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th
Cir. 2007).
24. Scranton Times, L.P. v. Wilkes-Barre Publ'g Co., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1269 (MD Pa. 2009).
25. Id. at 1274-75.
26. Id. at 1275.
27. Id.
28. Significantly, for our purposes, the court held that an allegation of
breach of an online contract stated a valid, not preempted claim. Id. at 1276-
77. Also, the point is not that all reported cases adopt positions that create this
shift, but simply that some do so. See Barclay's Capital Inc. v.
Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that an
aggregator that collects and publishes financial news and other information
1316 [Vol:51
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If this shifting of value in a digital world were to be
broadly followed, it would greatly reduce or eliminate
licensing revenue that might have arisen from new uses of
works, such as with respect to thumbnail use in search
engines, and transfer that value to search engines or other
aggregators. The result would be a weakening of economic
support for creative works by removing a potential source of
income.
This paper is not the forum to fully evaluate the
competing positions. It is clear, however, that reduced
enforceability of rights and enhanced exemptions, whether
caused by technology or law or policy decisions, reduces
financial incentives for engaging in innovation and creating
new works. This reduction in incentives is not always
important. Some types of "creative" works are done on low
budgets for relatively altruistic reasons. For example, I
might film my dog sleeping and post the video on the
Internet. My costs are minimal and my incentives to do this
are not aimed at financial gain. Similarly, in writing this
article, I am not engaged in a money-making enterprise. But
economic incentives are important for other types of works,
including the type of works that require investment and
substantial resources that may not be created if a likelihood
of financial return is compromised. The idea of reduced
rights and thereby reduced incentives harms this type of
development. The concept of weak rights is conducive to a
community in which everyone is relatively free to "borrow"
from or modify the works of others, what one author has
described as "hive" development. 9 But the weakening of
from Wall Street through an online subscription news service was liable for
misappropriation under the New York common law of unfair competition for the
daily copying and distribution of several financial service firms' equity research
trading recommendations prior to the market opening, and further holding that
a copyright infringement claim was appropriate).
29. See generally JARON LANIER, You ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO
(Knopf 2010). See also Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/issues/ip-and-free-
speech/fair-use-principles-usergen, (last visited Mar. 5, 2011)
Online video hosting services like YouTube are ushering in a new era of
free expression online. By providing a home for "user-generated
content" (UGC) on the Internet, these services enable creators to reach
a global audience without having to depend on traditional
intermediaries like television networks and movie studios. The result
has been an explosion of creativity by ordinary people, who have
2011] 1317
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economically relevant income streams has a serious impact on
industries that must invest to support the creation of new
works. Indeed, one traditional and important copyright
industry that requires resources and investment, the
newspaper industry, is in the midst of a general failure,
having lost many of its traditional income sources."
Within the broad debate, first sale issues are a frequently
discussed topic. Some arguments equate first sale with
protecting First Amendment issues. As we see below, first
sale concepts do not do this. In fact, the exemptions from
copyright infringement generated by a first sale are very
narrow and deal mostly with the retransfer or display of a
copy, and in the case of computer programs, several steps
essential to personal use of the program.3 ' Further, the
general ability of copyright (and other intellectual property
rights regimes) to limit by contract copying or distribution
that might otherwise be free speech or fair use, and the
ability of persons to contract away the right to make
statements publicly, are both well established.
The core of the first sale debate regarding transactions
within the United States has to do with two issues. The first
issue relates to secondary (e.g., resale) markets for tangible
copies distributed initially with the authority of the rights
owner. The issue is whether, through appropriately
structured transactions, the copyright owner should be able
to use copyright law coupled with contract law to help obtain
value from secondary markets that involve the retransfer of
copies, or whether first sale doctrine relegates the value in all
secondary or subsequent markets for transfer of a copyrighted
work to other parties, regardless of how the copyright owner
structures the initial transactions.
enthusiastically embraced the opportunities created by these new
technologies to express themselves in a remarkable variety of ways.
The life blood of much of this new creativity is fair use, the copyright
doctrine that permits unauthorized uses of copyrighted material for
transformative purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
30. See Richard Posner, Are Newspapers Doomed, THE BECKER-POSNER
BLOG (June 29, 2008, 2:07 PM), http-J/www.becker-posner-blog.com/2008/06/are-
newspapers-doomed-posner.html; Thomas C. Rubin, Chief Counsel, Intellectual
Property Strategy, Microsoft Corp., The Change We Need, Prepared Remarks to
the UK Association of American Publishers (Nov. 20, 2008) (on file with author).
31. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005).
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COPYRIGHT FIRST SALE
The issue is simple, but important, in this era of digital
works. Copies of digital works are identical to the original
and thus compete with the original work even if their transfer
technically occurs in a "secondary" market. The secondary
and retransfer markets for digital works are a potentially
important source of value for digital copyright work creators
and a potential threat even to their initial markets. If first
sale concepts were interpreted to exclude copyright control in
these markets regardless of the type of initial distribution,
this result would shift further significant value to third
parties and seriously undermine the economic incentives for
creative work that copyright rules are intended to promote. A
rights restrictor position argues that this is what should occur
because expanding unencumbered secondary markets and
uses promote significant social values. The rights enhancer
position disagrees. The issue is not whether secondary
markets are valuable, but whether rights owners should be
denied all access to any part of the value they produce, if they
choose to do so and the market accepts the choice.
The answer is apparent on the face of the Copyright Act:
first sale doctrine excludes copyright owners from secondary
market control only if they elect to sell or otherwise transfer
copies in a manner that allows a transferee to become an
owner of a copy, rather than licensing rights or making other
similar transfers that do not convey copy ownership.33
Indeed, § 109(d) provides: "The privileges prescribed by
subsections (a) and (c) do not, unless authorized by the
copyright owner, extend to any person who has acquired
possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright
owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring
ownership of it."3 4
The choice resides in the copyright owners' marketing
decision as to whether to convey or authorize conveyance of
copy ownership, and in the market's reaction to that decision.
If a contrary position were intended, the first sale doctrine
33. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the "first sale" doctrine actually
focuses on statutory privileges given to the owner of a copy. UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011). In addition to a sale, copy
ownership can be conveyed through a gift. See id. (holding that unsolicited, free
CDs delivered to a large number of recipients with labels purporting to restrict
use of the CDs in fact transferred title to the CDs).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (emphasis added).
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would have been described as the "first transferee" doctrine,
and the right to redistribute a copy without infringing the
property right would have been made applicable to anyone in
"lawful possession" of a copy. But Congress never seriously
considered this with respect to the general first sale doctrine
in § 109 of the Copyright Act and specifically rejected it in
reference to the parallel provisions of § 117 with respect to
computer programs.
A closely related issue centers on whether the copyright
owner, through appropriately structured transactions, can
establish various differentiated chains of distribution to
optimize its return. This involves what some have described
as price discrimination-e.g., the ability of the copyright
owner to transfer copies at one price or one set of conditions
for full commercial use, while doing a separate distribution of
the same work for a far lesser price or different conditions for
a single, consumer use.36 The ability to do this depends in
part on controlling the secondary market for copies (e.g.,
preventing the one-use purchaser from reselling to a multi-
use commercial user). But the issues are different. The
ability to control chains of distribution has, in itself, a
commercial value that gives the copyright holder the ability
to optimize its return on the work and to optimize the
availability of its product to others. This ability benefits
society generally by creating a world in which a purchaser
who needs only limited use does not need to pay a price that
subsidizes others who need more broadly framed uses. Yet,
some argue that this should not be allowed.
35. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 12 (July
31, 1978), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTUIPDF/Chapter3.pdf
(the proposed CONTU version provided that "it is not an infringement for the
rightful possessor of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that program . . . ."). Congress,
however, substituted the words "owner of a copy" into the final version. 17
U.S.C. § 117.
36. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing between distribution systems); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop
Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (distinguishing between
educational and commercial use distribution systems).
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B. Market Setting
A second contextual theme that needs to be understood
concerns how copyrighted works find their way to the
marketplace. Let us put aside cases of pure theft or blatant
and obvious infringement through the making and
distribution of numerous unauthorized copies of the work.
Then, let us put aside, for the moment, true gifts-not the so-
called free software that comes with copyright-based
restrictions, 37 but an actual, true gift.
Once these cases are eliminated, it should be apparent
that most authorized distributions of copyrighted works occur
in the context of a contract-based exchange. There is no
doubt that Congress, in enacting the Copyright Act,
understood this. The fact that contract terms are involved
means simply that the decision to sell or not sell copies is a
decision made by the property rights owner, and is either
accepted or rejected by the commercial or consumer market
into which the property rights owner first distributes its
valuable work. This is not a unilateral choice by the
copyright owner since its acceptability must be measured and
accepted or rejected in the relevant market. But it is a choice
made available to the rights owner.
Over the years, various copyright industries have made
different marketing choices for the core of their industries.
During the print era, book publishers chose to sell copies to
distributors on a "sale or return" basis, thus allowing
application of the first sale doctrine as to those distributors
and leaving the copyright holders with no more than a
contract claim if a resale by the distributor fell outside the
scope of the distribution contract." During the print era,
newspapers sold physical copies to subscribers and on-the-
street buyers, while licensing content from others to create
37. See NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1:90; see generally Greg Vetter, The
Collaborative Integrity of Open Source Software, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 563
(analyzing legal restrictions, including copyright based restrictions, on certain
open-source software).
38. See, e.g., Christian v. Barricade Books, Inc., No. Civ. 02-408-B, 2003 WL
21146168 (D.N.H. May 15, 2003) (sale or return); Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (infringement issue;
discusses sale or return format); Kogan v. Longstreet, 374 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (jurisdiction issue; discusses sale or return format). See also Van
Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publ'g Co., 281 N.E.2d 142
(1972) (discussing action by an author against publisher for breach of contract).
2011] 1321
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the print publications." Other copyright industries engaged
in mixed distribution approaches.4 0
In the digital era, all of the traditional content industries
have moved to a mixed model of distribution and many new
industries only use digital distributions subject to license
agreements.4 1 While simple outright sales of copyright works
continue to occur in some of the industries, the increasingly
common method of distribution is online access or
downloading, or a distribution under licenses related to
tangible copies. 4 2 There are many business reasons for using
these methods. The implemented options are dazzling:
licensed e-books in addition to sales of hard cover books,
newspapers sold in paper form in addition to online editions,
software provided on plastic medium and also made available
for access in the Internet cloud, etc.
39. See, e.g., Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books L.L.C., 283 F.3d 490 (2d.
Cir. 2002) (based on industry practice, grant of right to reproduce in book form
had narrow meaning limited to print books); Bruce v. Weekly World News, Inc.,
310 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2002).
40. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (broadcast television programs; copying is fair use); Specht v. Netscape
Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (download software); Trandes Corp.
v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993) (software transferred in
trade secret copies); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (copies transferred; licensee not an owner of the copy);
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (games transferred
with option for online use).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (articles
digitized); Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004)
(database available online); Greenberg v. Nat'1 Geographic Soc., 497 F.3d 1213
(11th Cir. 2007), rev'd en banc, 533 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2008) (no violation of
copyright when collective work author digitized prior magazine issues, but did
so in a manner that users would see the articles in their original context);
Random House, Inc., 283 F.3d 490 (e-books); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (DVD distribution of motion pictures);
UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT
ACT SECTION 104 REPORT 5-9 (August 2001), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf.
42. See, e.g., MDY Industries, L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't Inc., 629 F.3d 928
(9th Cir. 2010) (computer game); Vernor, 621 F.3d 1102 (software);
Register.Com, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (database); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (computer); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676
N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) (computer); Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., No. 06-
4855, 2007 WL 4212693 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2007) (cable service); Briceno v. Sprint
Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (terms of a cell phone
agreement binding).
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Thus, the basic transactional landscape is one with many
different market options and decisions, some involving a sale
of a copy. Unless the goal is to preclude this vibrant
diversity, the issue is not whether a transaction can create or
avoid a first sale and its effect on property law rights, but
how that can occur and whether the copyright owner chooses
that method. Perhaps an even more pertinent question is
whether copyright should continue to support creative
persons and entities by honoring their choices or the choices
of the entities to which they have transferred rights.
C. Preemption
The third contextual theme resides in the belief or
argument that the terms of the Copyright Act define a
delicate balance that, as a matter of policy, cannot be altered
by contract or other means.4 3 In fact, the "balance" enacted
under copyright law is not a delicate one, but it is a rough
balance, moderated by indeterminate doctrines such as the
meaning and scope of fair use,4 4 what constitutes copying an
idea as compared to an expression, 45 and what constitutes
43. See e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED 4, Jan. 1996,
available at http//www.wired.com/wiredlarchive/4.01/white.paper.html; Anne
K. Fujita, The Great Internet Panic: How Digitization is Deforming Copyright
Law, 2 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 (1996); Howard Besser, Recent Changes in
Copyright: Attacks Against the Public Interest, RECENT CHANGES TO COPYRIGHT
(Nov. 3, 2000), http://besser.tsoa.nyu.edu/howard/Papers/copyright99.html.
44. See, e.g., Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir.
1939) (explaining that because of its fluid nature, the fair use doctrine is one of
"the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright").
45. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). As to how one approaches distinguishing an
idea and expression, there are literally hundreds of cases. See generally Plains
Cotton Coop. Ass'n of Lubbock, Tex. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987); Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905
(2d Cir. 1980); Sid & Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). The primary case in this field talks about
considering a work in terms of levels of abstraction in that at some level of
abstraction, copying relates solely to the idea, rather than to the expression of
it. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about . . . but there is a point in
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected since
otherwise the playwright could prevent use of his ideas to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.
Id. at 121.
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copying a fact as compared to an expression about a fact.4 6
Equally important is the notion that whatever balance that
copyright law sets out, it is a balance focused solely on
property law, as articulated in the Copyright Act, and on
efforts under state law to create equivalent rights. And, as
we see below, that balance drawn in the Copyright Act defers
to contract terms in reference to whether a first sale occurs.
The idea that the balance set out in copyright law cannot
be altered by contract or other law, ultimately, is an
argument based loosely on the idea that federal copyright
(property) law preempts alternative solutions under other,
non-property laws. Removed from simplistic policy positions
or arguments, such as the assertion that interference with
copyright law balance is unacceptable, the notion of federal
preemption is grounded in the idea that, within the realm of
its competence, federal rules can override state law. There
are three conditions under which preemption might occur:
* state law is preempted if a federal law expressly
provides for such preemption (express preemption);
* state law is preempted if federal law entirely and
exclusively occupies a field and the state law attempts
to intrude into that field (field preemption); and
* state law is preempted if a state law is inconsistent
with and impedes the achievement of federal policy as
expressed in federal law or regulation (conflict
preemption).4
Copyright law exclusively occupies the field of property law
associated with copyright subject matter and rights
46. See BUC Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1144-45
(11th Cir. 2007) (stating that the merger doctrine does not preclude copyright
for compilation of information about yachts listed for sale; originality to be
determined by jury); CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1261 (9th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that estimated prices of coins constituted expression, rather than
unprotected facts); Barclay's Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp.
2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (copyright claim may exist); Nautical Solutions Mktg.
Inc. v. Boats.com, No. 8:02-CV-760-T-23TGW, 2004 WL 783121, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
April 1, 2004) ("Boat Rover's momentary copying of Yachtworld's public web
pages in order to extract from yacht listings facts unprotected by copyright law
constitutes a fair use . . .).
47. See, e.g., Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir.
1999). See also, NIMMER, supra note 5, § 3:59.
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equivalent to copyright. It contains an express preemption
provision, as § 301 states:
(a) [All] legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright . . . come within the subject matter of copyright
[and] are governed exclusively by this title. [No] person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State
with respect to . . . activities violating legal or equitable
rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright. . . ."
Properly, the cases have focused on the express statutory
reference to the preemptive effect being limited to laws that
purport to create rights equivalent to copyright law. The test
for when this occurs concerns whether the state claim merely
creates rights to prevent copying, distribution, or the like, or
whether another, different element is involved in establishing
the relevant rights under state law. This requires an analysis
of the elements of the cause of action and of the substantive
policy that sustains the claim under state law. In other
words, a court must make a qualitative judgment as to
whether the rights asserted are nonequivalent to copyright
rights, and whether they are based on justifiable state-law
interests as an independent policy. Or, the court must
determine whether the asserted rights are instead a mere
subterfuge for a state claim identical to copyright.
The most generally applied test is referred to as the
"extra-elements" test." The approach entails a two-part
standard. It involves, first, determining whether the cause of
action involves the subject matter of copyright and, second, if
so, determining whether the cause of action protects rights
that are "equivalent" to any of the exclusive rights of a federal
copyright or requires proof of a qualitatively significant,
additional element.5 0 According to this test, "[if] one or more
qualitatively different elements are required to constitute the
state-created cause of action being asserted, then the right
48. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (emphasis added).
49. Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d
396, 404 (5th Cir. 2000).
50. Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1995).
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granted under state law does not lie 'within the general scope'
of copyright and preemption does not occur."'
Under this standard, the vast majority of reported cases
reach the obvious conclusion that properly stated contract
claims are not preempted by copyright law.5 2 Protection of
contractual and other relationships is a valid state-law
interest independent of the property rights created under
copyright law. Allegations that a contractual obligation or a
confidence has been breached, allegations essential to a
contract claim or a trade secret claim, go beyond those
necessary for copyright infringement. The presence of
qualitatively independent elements based on sustainable
state policy removes the cause of action from the preemptive
scope of copyright law.
For contract claims, the additional element is obvious.
Contracts are based on agreements and enforceable promises.
Enforcing the terms of these promises is not equivalent to
enforcing property rights. The promise and the enforcement
of that promise is the extra element that makes the contract
and claims related to it different from the property rights
themes of copyright law.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg,6' the first appellate ruling dealing with the
enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses, held that the shrink-
wrap license was enforceable and that the contractual
restrictions it placed on the use of a non-copyrightable
database were not preempted by copyright law.54 The court
concluded that a contract and its enforcement do not create
51. See Computer Mgmt. Assistance Co., 220 F.3d at 404; Daboub, 42 F.3d at
289; Crooks v. Certified Computer Consultants, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 582, 586
(W.D. La. 2000).
52. See Lynn v. Sure-Fire Music Co., Inc., 237 F. App'x. 49, 54 (6th Cir.
2007) (holding that copyright did not preempt contract claims); Davidson &
Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005); Grosso v. Miramax Film
Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (an extra element precludes preemption
of contract claim); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
53. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447.
54. Id. at 1454-55. See also Grosso, 383 F.3d at 968 (an extra element
precludes preemption of contract claim); Telecom Technical Servs. Inc. v. Rolm
Co., 388 F.3d 820, 833 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that a claim requiring proof that
defendants had violated the terms of the plaintiffs software license had an
additional element that precluded preemption); Lynn, 237 F. App'x. at 54
(holding that copyright did not preempt contract claims); Architectronics, Inc. v.
Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
copyright did not preempt contract claim).
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rights equivalent to copyright for purposes of preemption
analysis.5 5  The rights involved are entirely different. The
court explained: "rights . . . equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright" are rights
established by law. 6 This means that the preempted rights
are those that restrict the options of persons who are
strangers to the information owner. In contrast to a
contractual right, a copyright is a right against the world.
Contracts affect only their parties, and thus strangers may do
as they please.
The court emphasized that the result does not change
simply because the contract deals with limiting the use of
information that is not protected under copyright law.
Illustrations of enforceable contracts relating to unprotected
works, or related to creating restrictions beyond copyright
language, abound, and according to the court, include
customer list trade secrets, video store home use rentals, and
LEXIS educational use licenses. Promises to pay for
information assets may be enforced even though federal law
offers no protection against third-party uses of that property.
The contract terms are not precluded by copyright rules.
[E]nforcement of the contract . . . will not withdraw any
information from the public domain. Everyone remains
free to copy and disseminate all 3,000 telephone books
that have been incorporated into ProCD's database.
Anyone can add codes and zip codes. ProCD's rivals have
done so. Enforcement of the shrinkwrap license may even
make information more readily available, by reducing the
price ProCD charges to consumer buyers. Whether a
particular license is generous or restrictive, a contract
may be enforced. The fact that property rights law does
not preempt enforcement of contractual terms, whether
embodied in shrinkwrap licenses, other commercial
standard forms, or custom-negotiated agreement, has been
recognized by all of the courts of appeal that have
considered the question.
Other courts of appeals that have addressed this issue
have held that contractual terms barring reverse engineering
55. ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1454-55.
56. Id. at 1453.
57. Id. at 1454.
58. Id. at 1455.
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that might be fair use are enforceable under contract law.
This, for example, was the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in Bowers v. Baystate Technologies,
Inc." In Bowers, the Federal Circuit held that the contract
term forbidding reverse engineering was not preempted by
copyright law and was enforceable.o Copyright policy did not
limit the application of a "no reverse engineering" clause.
Basically, the court distinguished between copyright policies
applicable where issues center on property rights, and
policies that support the enforcement of contractual
relationships. The contract was fully enforceable.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit confirmed
this result in Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung." The court held
that a shrink-wrap license that barred reverse engineering
was not preempted by federal fair use law.6 2 The defendant
had argued that this contract term impermissibly impinged
on the licensee's right to make fair use of the work." The
court said simply:
Appellants contractually accepted restrictions on their
ability to reverse engineer by their agreement to the terms
of the TOU [terms of use] and EULA. "[P]rivate parties
are free to contractually forego the limited ability to
reverse engineer a software product . . ." and "a state can
permit parties to contract away a fair use defense or to
agree not to engage in uses of copyrighted material that
are permitted by the copyright . . ."64
Davidson and the other courts that enforce contracts,
have it right. Copyright and its subject matter (property
rights in intellectual property) may be different from other
types of property law and subject matter. But there is at
least one way that copyright is not different: it deals with
property rights and leaves contracts, contract law, and
59. Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(contract precluded reverse engineering). See also Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v.
Hardin Const. Co., L.L.C., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that
copyright law did not preempt state law claim for breach of software end-user
license and contract rights, including the right to prohibit reverse engineering,
were not equivalent to exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright).
60. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1324-25.
61. 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
62. Id. at 638-39.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 639 (citation omitted) (quoting Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325-26).
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contract practice to the parties and to their agreements.
Contracts are agreements that reflect market choices made
by people acting in that market. Contracts are as important
in developing and distributing creative works as property
law. Indeed, contracts are more important.
Placed in our context, these decisions stand for the
simple premise that the copyright "balance" is in fact a
balance drawn in a manner that accepts the parties' abilities
to modify their relationship with respect to the copyright
subject matter by agreements. The balance is neither
immutable, nor perfect. Rather, it accepts the fact that
contractual agreements can adjust rights. Parties can
contractually agree to waive fair use privileges and can agree
to use restrictions on subject matter that the Copyright Act
covers. These contractual arrangements do not conflict with
copyright law, but are part of the expected interaction
between copyright and marketing choices by the copyright
owner.
The absence of conflict is even more apparent in
reference to first sale doctrines. As discussed below, the
privileges created under this doctrine only arise if transfers of
a copy convey ownership to the person in possession. But
whether that occurs hinges on the contractual terms of the
transfer. Contracts do not conflict with first sale concepts,
but rather are an integral part of determining when, and if,
first sale applies.
III. PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS OF A PERSON IN POSSESSION
In this setting, the interaction of contract and property
(copyright) law hinges initially on choices made by the
copyright owner as they are accepted (or rejected) in the
consumer or commercial market into which the copyright
owner chooses to distribute its copyrighted work. If the
choice is to sell copies as compared to licensing rights, the
Copyright Act provides that the choice to sell relinquishes a
limited subset of otherwise exclusive copyright rights that are
not relinquished under other choices.
The relevant terms of § 109 of the statute are:
(a) Notwithstanding the [exclusive rights of the copyright
owner], the owner of a particular copy . .. lawfully made
under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the
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copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy ....
(c) Notwithstanding the [exclusive rights of the copyright
owner], the owner of a particular copy lawfully made
under this title . . . is entitled . . . to display that copy
publicly . .. to viewers present at the place where the copy
is located.
(d) The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (c) do
not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to
any person who has acquired possession of the copy ... by
rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring
ownership of it.65
Similar, but somewhat broader coverage is provided for an
owner of a copy of a computer program.6 6
There are several conclusions apparent from the face of
this language. Let us focus on two. Initially, it is obvious
that the exemptions from the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner given to the owner of a copy are very narrow. On the
face of the basic language, this is not a broad exemption. It
does not authorize the copy owner to make and distribute
additional copies. It does not address what usages the copy
owner may make of the work, nor does it enable the copy
owner to make adaptations and change the work. It does not
limit contractual rights. It does not address competition or
antitrust issues and it does not address First Amendment
interests. All of these and other interests are covered, if at
all, by different law, including concepts of fair use. First sale,
on the other hand, deals primarily with the conditions under
which the property rights of the copyright owner are excluded
or compromised with respect to a copy owner's ability to
redistribute that copy. If a transferee takes ownership of a
copy under a first sale, it can redistribute the particular copy
without further permission from the copyright owner and
without infringing the copyright owner's exclusive
distribution right.
Even within this narrow scope, the concept of first sale is
further limited by the fact that the exemption is only
provided to persons who are "owners" of a copy of the work
65. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006) (emphasis added).
66. Id. § 117.
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and then only with respect to the copy they "own." Whether a
transaction conveys ownership to the transferee depends on
the terms of the contract involved in the transactional
conveyance to the transferee. It is in this respect that
contract terms dominate copyright property law, even as to
property rights issues. The terms of the contract, or other
transaction that conveys the copy, determine whether the
transferee is an owner or a "person who has acquired
possession of the copy . . . by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise,
without acquiring ownership of it.""
Therefore, the property rights question regarding the
first sale exemption hinges on whether the transactional
(contract) terms, those that moved the copy to the initial
transferee, trigger the copy ownership exemption. If the
transaction does not convey ownership of a copy, then first
sale exemptions are not present in property law or contract
law.
The policy adopted in first sale doctrine is often
misconstrued. The policy does not give everyone in lawful
possession of a copy of a work the right to resell that work. If
that were the case, then the statute should have referred to
rights of the first transferee. But that is not what happened;
rather, the exemption is a limited one. It gives freedom to
resell a copy, under copyright property law, only to owners of
a copy. What determines whether a transaction conveyed
copy ownership in a transactional context are the terms of the
contract. By the explicit terms of copyright law, contract
terms govern the scope, or even the existence, of the first sale
exemption.
Some argue that courts should, through a "common law"
approach, expand on this statutory scheme.18  That idea is
simply wrong. It is wrong because it argues for supplanting
congressional judgment with ad hoc judicial rulings. A
legislative decision was made about the proper scope of an
exemption for persons who receive a particular type of
transfer (copy ownership). This policy decision should not be
67. Id. § 109(d) (emphasis added).
68. Jason Schultz, Assistant Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the
Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic, University of California,
Berkeley School of Law, Panel Discussion at the Santa Clara University Law
Review and High Tech Law Institute Symposium: Exhaustion and First Sale in
IP (Nov. 5, 2010).
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undermined or altered by courts pursuing their own view of
appropriate policy. If the transferee does not receive
ownership of a copy, the exemption, or anything like it, does
not exist.
IV. THE ROLE OF CONTRACT
So, what is the relationship between copyright and
contract on this issue? Contract terms control whether the
transferee becomes an owner and puts contractual restraints
on what the transferee can do. Both aspects are important
and they create parallel, but independent, remedial or
obligation streams.
Contract terms create obligations between the parties to
the contract that are independent of the property-based
rights centered on copyright law." As a result, breach of a
contractual restriction yields a right to contractual remedies,
even if the transaction created a first sale and the conduct is
not infringement under property law. This contract claim is
independent of whether a first sale occurred. However, the
claim extends only to parties to the contract or the assignees
who accept the contract.
To be specific, let us assume that a licensee obtains a
copy through an enforceable contract that limits its right to
transfer that copy and restricts use of the copy to "household
purposes." The licensee nevertheless makes an unauthorized
transfer or uses the work for commercial purposes.
Regardless of whether the licensee is considered the owner of
the copy (it should not be in this hypothetical), the acts that
violate the terms of the contract constitute a breach of
contract as between the licensee and licensor.
The contract terms also determine whether a transfer of
ownership of a copy has occurred. This raises the core first
sale issue under copyright law because it determines the
scope of property rights as applied to subsequent transfers
and transferees of the copy. Thus, in the foregoing
hypothetical, whether the unauthorized transfer constitutes
infringement of the distribution right and whether it gives
the copyright owner a right of action against the transferee as
well as the transferor under property law may hinge on
69. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Servs. N. Am., L.L.C. v. Summit Nat'l., Inc.,
144 F. App'x. 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2005).
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whether the license contract terms conveyed ownership of the
licensed copy.
A. Enforceability of the Contract Terms
The first question to consider is whether the contract
terms are enforceable. Clearly, in most upstream or
business-to-business ("commercial") transactions, the
enforceability of a properly drafted and agreed-to contract
should seldom be questionable. Very few commentators
would disagree with this. Further, once the initial,
commercial contract neither makes a first sale, nor authorizes
a subsequent first sale, first sale rules become irrelevant.
There is no concept of a remote, good faith purchaser under
copyright law as to. property rights claims under copyright
law.70
The issue is not "whether" but "how" contract terms
convey a copy without creating a transfer of ownership. Much
of the debate about the use of contract terms to avoid a first
sale has focused on two structural issues.
B. Mass-market Licenses
The first issue raised by rights restrictor advocates
centered on whether a first sale can be avoided in mass
market contexts under any contractual context. There have
been many overlapping arguments purporting to support this
position; all have failed in judicial and legislative venues.
But two are relevant to the purposes of this article.
Early on, many academics and lawyers contested
whether the use of what once were described as "shrink-
wrap" license agreements could ever create an enforceable
contract.7" Their argument was that the contract terms were
70. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (initial
transfer not first sale; transferee cannot be an owner); Microsoft Corp. v. Grey
Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077 (D. Md. 1995); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony
Computers & Elecs. Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
71. See, e.g., Stephen Kyle Tapp & Daniel E. Wanat, Computer Software
Copyright Issues: Section 117 and Fair Use, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 197 (1992);
Robert A. Kreiss, Comment, Section 117 of the Copyright Act, 1991 BYU L. REV.
1497. See also Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don't Judge a Sale
by its License: Transfers Under the First-Sale Doctrine in the United States and
the European Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2001); Dennis S. Kariala, Federal
Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 511
(1997).
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not enforceable and, therefore, could not create a relationship
that was not a first sale. In essence, the position was that the
contractual terms were ineffective because of an absence of
assent or true bargaining. Some still claim to believe this to
be true. But the case law has broadly held that, properly
presented and assented to, these mass-market contracts are
enforceable. 2
The pro-rights reasoning that supports this case law is
simple: the vendor (copyright owner) can determine under
what conditions it chooses to market its works-whether by
sale, license, lease, or otherwise-and at what price. The
customer/licensee can decide whether to accept those
conditions or whether to purchase a different digital product.
The result is that, even in the mass-market, contractual
terms, properly presented and accepted by the transferee, can
define whether the transaction conveys ownership. The only
real issue is whether the terms are presented properly and
assent is obtained.
Some academics and lawyers have argued that the terms,
even if properly presented and accepted, entail a unilateral
circumvention of the Copyright Act's first sale rule if they are
allowed to be enforceable and, as a result, that they should be
precluded." This is simply wrong. This argument ignores
the context in which transactions occur, in a marketplace.
That marketplace involves many producers and many
consumers. Therefore, terms that are objectionable and
relevant to the consumer will not last in that marketplace,
since other options are available.
72. See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2588 (2003) (shrink wrap license was effective); Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (contract enforceable based
on use of computer without objecting to terms); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); I.Lan Sys. Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002) (shrink wrap license enforceable under Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash Ct. App. 1999), affd, 998 P.2d 305 (Wash.
2000) (license enforced).
73. See, e.g., Henry Sprott Long III, Reconsidering the "Balance" of the "Digital
First Sale" Debate: Re-examining the Case for a Statutory First Sale Doctrine to
Facilitate Second-Hand Digital Media Markets, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1183 (2008); John A.
Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits
Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004); David A. Rice, Licensing the Use of Computer
Program Copies and the Copyright Act First Sale Doctrine, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 157
(1990). Cf Holly K Towle, The Politics of Licensing Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 121
(1999) (calling for uniform legislation in the age of the Internet).
1334 [Vol:51
COPYRIGHT FIRST SALE
This is not a unilateral process. In fact, many modern
mass market licenses today give the licensee greater rights
than would occur under a simple sale, while regulating uses
to which first sale doctrine does not apply. Indeed, one
participant in the conference from which this paper emerged,
commented that consumers do not make choices based on the
nature of license terms." This is most likely not true. But
even if it were true, it does not mean that the terms are
oppressive as to consumers or commercial transferees.
C. Single Payment Perpetual License
The second context where any serious debate exists about
whether contract terms control first sale concerns licenses
that deal with a work embedded in a tangible media, and that
combine a single payment with a license that is perpetual as
long as the licensee conforms to the terms of the license. The
argument of rights restrictors is that this combination per se
transfers ownership even if the contract limits the ability of
the use of the digital work contained on the plastic medium."5
The parallel position would be that if I lend you my car
without specifically limiting how long you can continue to use
it, but on the condition that you are not to take the car
outside of Houston, you own the car. That is, of course,
facially absurd.
The focus of this rights restrictor argument is on
ownership of the plastic media. The statute gives first sale
rights to the owner of a copy. The anti-rights position is that
if you obtain the plastic medium for a single payment and are
never contractually required to return the plastic, you own
the plastic. So be it. But why does that matter? The rights
restrictor argument, intended to reduce the scope of the
rights of a copyright holder, misconstrues both the statute
74. Panelist discussing Copyright Issues, Afternoon Panel Discussion at the
Santa Clara University Law Review and High Tech Law Institute Symposium:
Exhaustion and First Sale in IP (Nov. 5, 2010).
75. See DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360
(Fed. Cir.1999) (describing and rejecting this approach as being overly
simplistic). Interestingly, one source cited for this argument was a portion of a
book I wrote in 1985, before any significant development in case law or practice.
See RAYMOND NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY (Warren, Gorham
& Lamont 1985). The flaw in that early analysis, as I point out here and as
appellate courts have uniformly concluded, is that focusing on ownership of the
plastic focuses on the least valuable part of the copy.
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and the nature of contractual terms. Every appellate court to
consider the issue has rejected it."6
First, it is important to consider whether the plastic
medium is the primary concern. The first sale concept gives
privileges to the owner of a "copy". But the statute defines a
copy not as the plastic alone, but as the plastic medium with
the copyright work fixed to it. The language is as follows:
"Copies" are material objects . . . in which a work is fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device. The term "copies" includes the material object .
. . in which the work is first fixed."
The "copy" is not simply the plastic medium, but the
combination of the work and the plastic or other material
object. Given that, all appellate courts that have addressed
the issue have held that you are not the owner of a "copy" if
the contractual transfer to you significantly restricts your
right to use the most valuable part of the "copy"-the work
embedded in it." A license transaction that gives the licensee
the right to use the work one time only is not a first sale of a
copy, even if the transferee is never required to return the
plastic medium on which the work is fixed. The transferor
has not conveyed or received the full value of that copy that
would be associated with a first sale. Would you pay the
same amount for a single use license as you would pay for an
unlimited use copy? Of course not. The transferee is not
paying to acquire the plastic medium, but is acquiring the
copy, the value of which consists primarily of the copyrighted
work and the right to use it.
Regardless of the policy rationale for the first sale
doctrine, limited use licenses do not convey ownership of a
copy. Yet, the argument has been made that, as to copies, the
statute recognizes only a sale or a lease (or rental). This,
again, focuses solely on the tangible medium: the plastic. But
the statute specifically provides otherwise, as § 109 of the
76. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); DSC
Commc'ns Corp., 170 F.3d at 1360 (no first sale); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard
Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., Vernor, 621 F.3d 1102; DSC Commc'ns Corp., 170 F.3d at 1360
(no first sale); Stenograph L.L.C., 144 F.3d 96.
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Copyright Act states: "The privileges prescribed by [the first
sale doctrine] do not, unless authorized by the copyright
owner, extend to any person who has acquired possession of
the copy . . . from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan,
or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it.""7  This
language specifically recognizes that a transfer other than a
lease, loan, or rental may not transfer ownership of a copy.
The other option clearly encompasses a license of a digital
work.
V. WHAT TERMS RESULT IN A TRANSFEREE NOT BEING AN
OWNER?
The proper question is not whether, but how the terms of
a contract can establish a transaction that does not entail a
first sale. The genesis of first sale discussions is the Supreme
Court decision in Bobbs Merrill v. Straus.80  That case,
decided in 1908, examined whether a notice below the
copyright notice in a hard-cover book could restrict the resale
price that was permitted for the particular copy."1 The Court
held that the notice was not effective. 82 But in that case,
there was no contract argument presented to the Court. The
Court commented:
The precise question ... is, does the sole right to vend ...
secure to the owner of the copyright the right, after a sale
of the book to a purchaser, to restrict future sales . . .
because of a notice in the book that a sale at a different
price will be treated as an infringement . . . ? .[Tihere is
no claim in this case of contract limitation, nor license
agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the book.,"
So, while Bobbs Merrill originated the first sale doctrine, it
does not provide guidance on when contract terms create or
fail to create a first sale. For that answer, we need to look to
more recent contract-based decisions. There are two
appellate court decisions that provide guidance.
The first case is DSC Communications v. Pulse
Communications,84 decided by the Court of Appeals for the
79. 17 U.S.C. § 109(d).
80. Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
81. Id. at 341-42.
82. Id. at 350-51.
83. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
84. 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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Federal Circuit in 1999. This case involved separately
licensed software embedded in communications system
hardware. The software contract precluded transfer or sale of
the software, and it also precluded reverse engineering. The
Federal Circuit acknowledged that the idea of ownership in
this context was unclear, but held that-given the legislative
history of § 117 (the first sale section related to computer
software)-ownership was different than "rightful
possession":
Unfortunately, ownership is an imprecise concept, and the
Copyright Act does not define the term. Nor is there much
useful guidance to be obtained from either the legislative
history of the statute or the cases that have construed it.
The National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") . . . [i]n its final report, ....
proposed a version of section 117 that is identical to the
one that was ultimately enacted, except for a single
change. The proposed CONTU version provided that "it is
not an infringement for the rightful possessor of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making of
another copy or adaptation of that program .
Congress, however, substituted the words "owner of a
copy" in place of the words "rightful possessor of a copy."
The legislative history does not explain the reason for the
change, but it is clear from the fact of the substitution of
the term "owner" for "rightful possessor" that Congress
must have meant to require more than "rightful
possession" to trigger the section 117 defense.85
The court then rejected two polar positions on how to
determine whether a person in possession of a copy was an
owner. It first focused on an earlier Ninth Circuit decision
that, it believed, had held that any transaction labeled as a
license of a work did not transfer copy ownership." This
Ninth Circuit conclusion was consistent with commercial
licensing practice. Commercial license agreements that
involve delivery of a copy often do not address ownership of
the copy or, if they do address it, state the seemingly obvious
principle that a licensee is not an owner. Nevertheless, the
85. Id. at 1360 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting U.S. DEPT.
OF COMMERCE, PB-282141, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 30 (1978)).
86. Id. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.
1993).
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Federal Circuit concluded that an analysis based solely on the
label given to the transaction was too blunt-edged, and that a
more nuanced approach was needed."
The court also rejected the argument that a single-
payment, perpetual license constitutes a sale or transfer of
ownership of the copy-the plastic medium. Its comments on
this point underscore the weakness in the sale argument:
[We think that view is] overly simplistic. The concept of
ownership of a copy entails a variety of rights and
interests. The fact that the right of possession is
perpetual, or that the possessor's rights were obtained
through a single payment, is certainly relevant to whether
the possessor is an owner, but those factors are not
necessarily dispositive if the possessor's right to use the
software is heavily encumbered by other restrictions that
are inconsistent with the status of owner.8 8
The last part of this quotation signals the focus of the court.
That focus was not centered on alleged ownership of the
plastic medium, but on ownership of the copy, especially
including the valuable rights in the work that is part of the
copy. The court commented:
Each of the . . . agreements limits the contracting RBOC's
right to transfer copies of the . . . software or to disclose
the details of the software to third parties. . . . Such a
restriction is plainly at odds with the section 109 right to
transfer owned copies of software to third parties. The
agreements also prohibit the RBOCs from using the
software on hardware other than that provided by DSC. If
the RBOCs were "owners of copies" of the software, section
117 would allow them to use the software on any
hardware, regardless of origin. Because the DSC-RBOC
agreements substantially limit the rights of the RBOCs
compared to the rights they would enjoy as "owners of
copies" of the . . . software under the Copyright Act, the
contents of the agreements support the characterization of
the RBOCs as non-owners of the copies of the . . .
software.89
87. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 170 F.3d at 1360.
88. Id. at 1362.
89. Id. at 1361-62.
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If the agreement does not give the transferee substantially all
of the rights that it would have as a copy owner, the
transaction does not convey copy ownership. 9
More recently, the Ninth Circuit visited the ownership
question in Vernor v. Autodesk." Vernor involved a single
payment perpetual software license that contained a number
of limitations on the licensee's use of the software and its
right to transfer the software. 92 Copies of the software were
sold to Vernor, who then offered them for resale on the eBay
online auction system.93  Vernor, who operated a resale
business and did not use the software, did not assent to the
license terms. 94 But the original licensee did.9' The question
was whether Vernor's intended resale was protected by the
first sale doctrine. 96
The basic concept, accepted by the parties and the court,
was that if the first transfer was not an authorized first sale
and did not give the first licensee the right to make a first
sale under the authority of the licensor, then Vernor was not
protected by the first sale doctrine." This is an application of
traditional copyright doctrine: there is no concept of good
faith purchaser in ordinary copyright law.9" That doctrine
exists because the rights involved are intangible in nature,
while good faith purchase concepts typically focus on rights in
tangible objects.
The District Court held that the single payment
perpetual license terms controlled and that, as a result, the
first transfer was a sale even though the license severely
restricted use of the work." The trial court's analysis hinged
on a strange concept. It felt bound by its interpretation of an
early Ninth Circuit case,too even though the much more
90. Id.
91. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
92. Id. at 1104.
93. Id. at 1105-06.
94. Id. at 1105.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1106.
97. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2010).
98. Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208,
211 (E.D. N.Y. 1994); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp.
1077, 1083 (D. Md. 1995).
99. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
100. See id. (citing United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190-92 (9th Cir.
1977)).
1340 [Vol:51
COPYRIGHT FIRST SALE
recent decisions in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, 01
and Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Department,102
contradicted that early decision.'o
The Ninth Circuit reversed lower court's decision.10 4 It
adopted an integrated approach by reconciling its prior
opinions, 0 5 and properly focused on the overall terms of the
license and whether the license terms gave rights to the
licensee equivalent to the owner of a copy. 06 The Ninth
Circuit set out a more formulaic approach to distinguishing
between a transfer of ownership and a license that does not
transfer ownership than did the Federal Circuit in DSC
Communications.o0 The Ninth Circuit's ruling stated: "We
hold today that a software user is a licensee rather than an
owner of a copy where the copyright owner (1) specifies that
the user is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the
user's ability to transfer the software; and (3) imposes notable
use restrictions."0 s The court's analysis did not conclude that
these three elements were the only elements that make a
license transaction not a sale of a copy, but that they clearly
indicate a license, rather than a transfer of copy ownership.
This is a correct decision.
In the particular case, the court held that there was no
transfer of copy ownership:
Autodesk retained title to the software and imposed
significant transfer restrictions: it stated that the license
is nontransferable, the software could not be transferred
or leased without Autodesk's written consent, and the
software could not be transferred outside the Western
Hemisphere. The [license agreement] also imposed use
restrictions against the use of the software outside the
Western Hemisphere and against modifying, translating,
101. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.
1993).
102. Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.
2006).
103. Compare Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Wise, 550 F.2d at 1190-1192) with MAI Systems Corp., 991 F.2d at 518-
19 and Wall Data, Inc., 447 F.3d at 784-85.
104. Vernor, 621 F.3d 1102.
105. Id. at 1110-11.
106. See id. at 1109.
107. Compare id. at 1111 with DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc.,
170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir.1999).
108. Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
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or reverse-engineering the software, removing any
proprietary marks from the software or documentation, or
defeating any copy protection device. Furthermore, the
[license agreement] provided for termination of the license
upon the licensee's unauthorized copying or failure to
comply with other license restrictions. 09
The focus of ownership issues is not simply of ownership of
the plastic medium, but whether the transaction gave rights
in the work that is part of the copy and that are consistent
with copy ownership.
It is important to recognize that DSC Communications
and Vernor were referring to the effect of contractual
restrictions on use of the digital work. This was underscored
by the Ninth Circuit's holding in UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Augusto, 10 a case decided shortly after Vernor. In Augusto,
music publishers distributed unsolicited, free CDs to a large
number of people, including reviewers and radio stations."'
The CDs had labels that purported to restrict their use. One
label said "for promotional use only", while another suggested
that "acceptance" of the unsolicited CD would constitute
acceptance of the limited terms, but gave no indication of
what process or actual act would indicate assent to terms.1 12
The law suit was not brought against the original recipients,
but against a third party reseller who had obtained some of
the CDs.113 There was no proof relating to contractual assent
by the original recipients; indeed, the CDs were sent without
any controls or tracking and it is doubtful that the original
recipients could even be identified. 114 The court reached the
obvious conclusion:
Because the record here is devoid of any indication that
the recipients agreed to a license, there is no evidence to
support a conclusion that licenses were established under
the terms of the promotional statement. Accordingly, we
conclude that UMG's transfer of possession to the
109. Id. at 1111-12.
110. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). The
Ninth Circuit held that unsolicited, free CDs delivered to a large number of
recipients with non-contractual labels purporting to restrict use of the CDs
transferred title to the CDs. Id. at 1183.
111. Id. at 1177.
112. Id. at 1177-78.
113. Id. at 1178.
114. Id. at 1180.
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recipients, without meaningful control or even knowledge
of the status of the CDs after shipment, accomplished a
transfer of title.115
This conclusion was buttressed by a federal statute providing
that, in the case of unsolicited delivery of products, the
recipients can treat the product as a gift and as their own
property116-a position inconsistent with the restrictive
notices."
Overall, Augusto simply restates the concept set out in
Bobbs-Merrill: non-contractual notices do not suffice to
prevent a first sale. This may stand for a principle that
might create concerns among some in the open source
community who believe that the licenses used there are non-
contractual in nature. That principle is that the presence of a
non-contractual notice may be insufficient to limit the
transfer of ownership. This is certainly true in circumstances
where the product is not solicited and the record is devoid of
any proof that license terms were accepted, except by silence.
VI. THE POLICY ISSUE
Combining DSC Communications and Vernor, the clear
message is that the proper focus on ownership issues is not on
the relatively irrelevant plastic medium, but on the rights in
the work and whether the rights conveyed rise to a level
consistent with ownership of the copy. This premise is
consistent with the congressional judgment in both of the first
sale exemptions.118 It creates a setting in where if the rights
owner chooses to do so, and can obtain acceptance of the
relevant contractual terms in the market, the rights owner
can use its property rights to manage how the copies are used
and redistributed.
This is a correct policy result. It allows the copyright
owner to attempt to optimize commercialization of its work by
making judgments about how best to market the work.
Whether this in fact results in higher economic return
depends on the quality of the work and the quality of the
marketing choice that the copyright owner makes. But the
115. Id. at 1182.
116. 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (2006).
117. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1180-81 (9th Cir.
2011).
118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 117 (2006).
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rule places the choice in the proper hands and provides the
best opportunity to enhance the incentives for creating new
works. Certainly it is a better policy choice than artificially
narrowing the copyright owner's options.
So, what is the contrary policy?
The primary contrary position argues that copyright
owners' rights should be narrow, and that owners should not
be allowed to expand their rights through the use of contract
terms.1 19  This is the rights-restrictors argument earlier
discussed. 12 0 At its core is the premise that the minimum
rights necessary should be all the support that copyright law
gives to creators of copyrighted works. 1 21 One variation of
this argument is that contracts should not be allowed to
"override" the policy in the first sale doctrine that Congress
enacted. Allegedly, that statutory policy is one that frees up
distribution and use after a first distribution. But as we have
seen before, this is not the policy that Congress adopted.
Instead, the statute limits the right to redistribute to persons
who become owners of a copy and, then, only as to that
particular copy.122 So the statutory policy decision actually
makes the property rights, in this respect, specifically subject
to the terms of the contract.
One other contrarian argument merits attention. This is
the view that the first sale doctrine should not be subject to
narrowing by contract because to do so allows copyright
owners to interfere with "secondary" markets (i.e. markets in
which transferees resell licensed works for a profit). The
argument is that allowing copyright owners to use property
rights to control resale loses value for resellers.123  The
reasoning is that these secondary markets are important for
consumers who can obtain "used" goods for lower prices and
that this social benefit would be forfeited if copyright owners
were able to prevent resale of copies, by choosing to do so
through properly structured transactions. 124
119. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1:2.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
121. NIMMER, supra note 5, § 1:2.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 109.
123. This, in essence, was what the reseller in the Vernor case argued-"you
have no right to prevent me from purchasing and reselling copies of your
software." Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010).
124. Id.
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The actual reasoning is that value created in secondary
markets should be given to parties other than the copyright
owners. In a world of paper and other non-digital works, the
idea that control of a used copy (secondary market) should not
necessarily be subject to access by copyright owners made
sense. Clearly, a used book does not have the same value or
the same market as a new book, and does not typically
compete in fact with new books. But, as we are increasingly a
digital information society, the difference between "used" and
"new" copies is increasingly immaterial. When this is true,
cutting out the copyright owner's interest in influencing or
obtaining value from secondary markets also significantly
affects the marketability of its product in the initial market.
This potentially creates a double loss of economic incentives
that is justified by neither the statute, nor the basic policy of
copyright law.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
As stated at the beginning of this article, for
transactions within the United States, the relationship
between contract terms and the copyright law concept of first
sale is quite simple to label as matter of current law and of
proper policy.
The relationship works in two directions. First, nothing
in the Copyright Act or in the doctrine of first sale prevents
parties from agreeing, through a valid contract, to establish
different use restrictions or privileges from those set out
under copyright law. Copyright law does not preempt these
contractual arrangements, nor do they disturb the balance set
out in copyright law. That balance contemplates that rights
owners (if they choose to do so) may obtain economic benefits
from their creative work by bringing those works to the
market under economic terms of their choosing. This balance
necessarily assumes the presence of contractual relationships
that shape the market and the economic terms.
The relationship between contract and first sale also
functions in a second direction, and here the parameters are
even clearer than in the first. Contractual terms determine
the applicability of first sale doctrine as a matter of copyright
law. This is because Congress chose to limit the privileges
under first sale to persons who have become an owner of a
copy and the process of obtaining ownership of a copy
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involves, in virtually all commercial cases, a contractual
arrangement sufficient to convey ownership. The presence or
absence of a first sale ownership privilege thus depends on
the terms of a contract. This result is specifically grounded in
the copyright statute itself. It is also grounded in appropriate
policy, since it enables copyright owners to establish
differentiated channels of distribution and to obtain some
value from secondary markets, if they choose to do so,
provided the market accepts the methodology they use.
Thus, the question is not whether contract terms can
control the applicability of first sale doctrine, but how they
can be used to do so-e.g., what terms prevent or establish
the presence of a first sale (copy ownership)? As we have
seen, both the Ninth Circuit and the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals have focused on terms that relate to the transferee's
right to use or transfer the work. The two courts phrased
their approach in slightly different terms, but they are
consistent on a fundamental point: a transferee is not an
owner of a copy if the contract restricts us of the most
valuable part of the copy (the work) in ways that are
inconsistent with the rights that would be associated with
ownership.
So, in both directions, properly established contracts and
their terms govern over the application of the concept of first
sale.
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